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Abstract
The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has halted economic activity world-
wide, hurting firms and pushing them toward bankruptcy. This paper provides
a unified framework to organize the policy debate related to firm financing
during the downturn, centered along four main points. First, the economic
crisis triggered by the spread of the virus is radically different from past crises,
with important consequences for optimal policy responses. Second, to avoid
inefficient bankruptcies and long-term detrimental effects, it is important to
preserve firms’ relationships with key stakeholders, like workers, suppliers,
customers, and creditors. Third, firms can benefit from “hibernating,” using
the minimum bare cash necessary to withstand the pandemic, while using
credit to remain alive until the crisis subdues. Fourth, the existing legal and
regulatory infrastructure is ill-equipped to deal with an exogenous systemic
shock such as this pandemic. Financial sector policies can help increase the
provision of credit, while posing difficult choices and trade-offs.
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1. Introduction
The coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak has imposed a heavy toll on economic ac-
tivity worldwide. The shock has been sudden and concurrent across countries, and
it has been characterized by significant uncertainty regarding its magnitude and
duration. Because of the rapid transmission of the virus, people around the globe
have simultaneously isolated following strict public health orders. Social distancing
is an emergency measure that saves lives, but it has led to a synchronized collapse
in economic activity. Major stock market indexes have crashed at an unprecedented
pace (Baker et al., 2020; Huang et al., 2020), erasing close to one-third of their value
in just a matter of weeks, hitting industries across the board, reflecting expected
losses in the corporate sector (Figure 1).
Policy makers around the world have rapidly deployed a wide arsenal of tools to
cope with the inevitable economic recession, pledging aid to firms in Europe and the
United States equivalent to their entire profits for the past two years (Economist,
2020).1 Many of these policies focus on helping firms manage the crisis (Ilzetzki,
2020). Germany’s bazooka program included e550 billion in new loans to firms
through its state investment bank (Garicano, 2020). In the United States, a relief
package of over US$2 trillion has provided economic assistance to both households
and firms (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020). The Federal Reserve has also extended
liquidity to firms through the purchase of financial securities in capital markets (De
Vito and Gomez, 2020a).
Economists have come up with several other proposals. Governments could be
the backstop for absorbing losses (Beck, 2020) or act as a payer of last resort (Saez
and Zucman, 2020). Others have suggested shield packages aimed at supporting
firms in financial distress (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2020). Additional proposals in-
clude a negative lump sum tax for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Drechsel
and Kalemli-Özcan, 2020), a liquidity lifeline to cash-strapped firms (Brunnermeier
et al., 2020), evergreening loans (Brunnermeier and Krishnamurthy, 2020), debt
extension for SMEs without bank capital charges (Acharya, 2020), and preserving
bank capital (Acharya and Steffen, 2020).
In this paper, we provide a unified framework to organize the policy debate
related to the financing of firms during the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of this
discussion is to understand the optimal policy choices given the challenges and trade-
offs that policy makers face when trying to save firms from collapsing, as well as the
incentives they generate. The framework is centered along four main points.
First, the economic crisis triggered by the spread of the coronavirus is radically
different from past economic and financial crises. Unlike in previous crises, this
time the shock did not originate in the financial sector and was not the result of
financial intermediaries or companies behaving irresponsibly due to ex-ante moral
1The continuously growing policy trackers compiled by the IMF, the World Bank, and Yale’s
Program on Financial Stability, and discussed in places like Econfip and Elgin et al. (2020), provide
just a glimpse of the many initiatives being implemented or proposed.
1
Figure 1: Magnitude of the COVID-19 Shock across Countries and Industries



















0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Number of days since Feb 24, 2020
 US (S&P 500) UK (FTSE 100) Germany (DAX)
Japan (Nikkei 225) Emerging Markets (MSCI) US during the Global Financial Crisis
(b) Decline in Stock Markets across Industries in the United States
COVID-19 Pandemic GFC 2008-09
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Telecommunications -24% 1 -35% 10
Technology -25% 2 -26% 3
Health care -25% 3 -24% 2
Consumer services -30% 4 -29% 9
Consumer goods -31% 5 -23% 1
Utilities -35% 6 -29% 8
Basic materials -36% 7 -40% 12
Transportation -36% 8 -26% 4
Industrials -38% 9 -28% 7
Financial services -41% 10 -27% 6
Real estate -41% 11 -27% 5
Energy -54% 12 -39% 11
Simple Average -35% -29%
S&P 500 Index -31% -28%
1
Note: Panel (a) shows the cumulative changes since February 24th, 2020, of stock market indices across countries.
It includes also cumulative changes after September 14th, 2008, of S&P 500. Panel (b) shows stock market changes
across industries in the United States, measured through iShares exchange-traded funds (ETFs). The changes
in stock market prices are cumulative changes calculated over 30 days starting on February 24th, 2020, for the
COVID-19 pandemic, and September 12th, 2008, for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
Source: Authors calculations based on Refinitiv data.
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hazard (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Moreover, the
shock is transitory in nature. These features have important implications for the
menu of options available for policy makers. In a typical crisis, there is a problem in
the financial sector that needs to be resolved, so the optimal response is to quickly
identify and isolate the part of the financial system that is in trouble (e.g., insolvent
banks, bankrupt companies, or distressed corporate or sovereign debt markets). In
many instances, this entails liquidating firms in financial distress. In this way, the
rest of the financial system remains safe and keeps operating and financing the real
sector (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 2010; Calomiris et al., 2016). However, because
the real and financial sectors were in good health before the pandemic struck, ac-
tivating the prevailing crisis-resolution mechanisms might prove counterproductive
as they could cut financing to firms in need of temporary funds.
Second, firms have relationships with an array of key stakeholders, such as
workers, suppliers (of intermediate inputs, equipment, commercial real estate), cus-
tomers, and creditors. These relationships are costly and time-consuming to build,
maintain, and adjust (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). Because firms face costs in de-
veloping these relationships, avoiding destruction during a temporary negative shock
can allow for a quicker economic recovery (Gourio and Rudanko, 2014; Huneeus,
2018). Namely, destroying the relationships between firms and stakeholders only to
reconstruct them post-pandemic would be inefficient, and could lead to long-term
economic consequences and hysteresis effects. Once a vaccine or an effective treat-
ment is found, the original source of the COVID-19 shock will mostly disappear, but
the economic effects will linger if firms need to establish a new set of relationships.
Third, as a response to the transitory COVID-19 shock, some initiatives have
argued in favor of “freezing the economy” so it can resume later (Atlantic, 2020a,b;
Wall Street Journal, 2020). But the term freeze can be somewhat misleading; it
is not possible to completely stop the economy or firms in time. Workers need
a basic income during the lockdown, some firms need to deliver essential prod-
ucts and services, and minimal maintenance and operations are required, leading to
some expenses. A more appropriate term may be “hibernation.” This means using
the minimum bare cash necessary for firms to withstand the pandemic lockdown
and the social distancing measures. That cash is utilized to freeze firms’ relation-
ships with their stakeholders, while adapting their activities, but not to freeze firms
themselves. During the hibernation period, payments to different stakeholders are
adjusted downwards, like for example workers’ wages or accounts payable, such that
firms and their relationships remain viable in the long run. Credit can help signif-
icantly in this period, providing the cash that firms do not have on hand. Even
firms that have ceased operations during the lockdown will need financing to stay
alive and remain ready to reopen when the lockdown eases (akin to the energy that
animals need during their hibernation).2
2Khan and Wagner (2020) provide a model to analyze the funding of temporary shutdowns in
production. The optimal policy in their setting requires promising attractive funding conditions to
firms for when the pandemic is over. This provides incentives for firms to hang on, that is, neither
to go out of business nor to return to full production immediately.
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Fourth, despite the desirability for credit during the hibernation period, the ex-
isting legal and regulatory infrastructure (bankruptcy codes, crisis resolution mecha-
nisms) is not designed to deal with an exogenous systemic shock such as the COVID-
19 pandemic. In fact, the existing infrastructure of financial systems could actually
amplify the problem, as it tends to penalize firms that face difficulties, leading in
the current scenario to inefficient bankruptcies and excessive destruction of relation-
ships. Policy makers were prompted to innovate and reassess the financial policy
response while the health crisis gets resolved. This has implied working with the fi-
nancial sector to improve the likelihood that viable firms are not shut down, and are
in fact assisted during the pandemic cycle by a financial infrastructure that has been
prepared to withstand other types of shocks. Various financial sector policies can
help in the provision of credit, while posing different trade-offs. We group policies
along two dimensions: those aimed at adapting the institutional framework to meet
the challenges imposed by the pandemic shock, and those aimed at extending credit
to firms. These policies have distinct implications for different firms, countries, and
generations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the nature
of the COVID-19 crisis and how it differs from previous crises. Section 3 presents
the idea of hibernation and how credit might help during the hibernation period.
Section 4 discusses the policy actions and trade-offs. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Nature of the COVID-19 Crisis
Past economic crises (such as the Debt Crisis of the 1980s, the 1997-98 Asian Crisis,
and the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis or GFC) originated in financial vulnerabil-
ities. Typically, financial intermediaries (such as banks) took excessive risks, got
in trouble, suffered runs, lost access to funding, and, in turn, stopped lending to
the real sector. In other cases, debt markets froze as borrowers became unable to
rollover existing liabilities. These problems in the financial sector transmitted to
the rest of the economy, generally causing a recession.
In contrast, the root of the COVID-19 crisis lies outside the financial sector:
a highly contagious virus transmitted from animals to humans. In a few months,
since being spotted in Wuhan, China, the virus has spread throughout populations
across the world. The highly contagious nature of the virus has meant that many
people have gotten sick at once, and a historically high percentage of those have
required intensive care, rapidly overwhelming existing hospital capacity. To dimin-
ish the number of concurrently infected people and to accommodate proper hospital
care for the sick, policy makers were forced to take a dismal policy decision: impose
social distancing to flatten the curve of infections and give health care systems a
greater chance to treat the infected population. Cities have shut down, mandatory
quarantines have been implemented, and borders have been closed. Containment
measures are saving lives but have brought economic activity to a near halt.
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Unlike in previous crises, during the COVID-19 outbreak, economies have faced
a combination of a supply shock (most immediately, employees cannot go to work,
impairing production, disrupting supply chains, freezing investments) and a demand
shock (notably, households and firms cannot buy certain goods and services), which
reinforce each other (Eichenbaum et al., 2020; Guerrieri et al., 2020; Rogoff, 2020).
The shock has transmitted quickly throughout the economy, affecting firms and
industries across the board. Importantly, it has also disturbed a wide range of eco-
nomic relationships, like those between firms and their several stakeholders.
With business revenue plummeting, corporate cash flows have collapsed at an
unprecedented scale. Firms have struggled to survive as their working capital gets
depleted. The ensuing cash crunch can be depicted by the average number of days
that firms can continue to pay for their operating expenses with the cash they his-
torically had on hand (Figure 2). Some of the industries that have been hit hard by
the pandemic crisis, such as restaurants, retail stores, and service firms (hospitality,
leisure, and hotels) will last for only a few weeks if revenues cease. Nevertheless, the
availability of cash before the crisis can help firms during the pandemic shock and
also in the recovery (Joseph et al., 2019). But in some cases the available cash will
not be sufficient (De Vito and Gomez, 2020b), and thus, a firm’s ability to continue
operating during the pandemic shock, thus depends on whether it can raise addi-
tional financing, as well on its ability to adjust expenses, such as payroll, supplier
payments, and other overhead costs.
The resilience of the corporate sector is also tightly linked to the magnitude and
duration of the pandemic shock and how much of the economic losses are borne by
the different stakeholders that interact with the firms. Because the source of the
crisis this time around is specific to the COVID-19 pandemic, once a vaccine or an
effective treatment is found, the source of the crisis could basically disappear. That
is, the health shock is transitory in nature. Nonetheless, there has been a high de-
gree of uncertainty about its severity and the ramifications on the overall economy.
The longer the heightened levels of uncertainty and paralysis last, the tougher it
will be for firms to withstand and survive the shock. The losses incurred during the
pandemic will need to be absorbed over time.
Fundamentally, as long as the shock does not persist for too long, most firms
should remain viable: that is, their net worth will still be positive. However, firms
have faced a temporary slowdown or even a pause in business as a consequence of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the containment measures taken by governments around
the world. Furthermore, the shock has led to a sharp and widespread increase in
credit risk, as not all firms can survive a long-lasting lockdown, and those that do
survive might lose lines of business or customers. Industries as a whole will weather
the shock and survive. For example, the restaurant industry will not disappear and
neither will the airline industry. But the same cannot be said about individual firms.
Some will cope with the shock or scrape by. Others will end up defaulting and break-
ing contracts with their different stakeholders, even if they do not shut down entirely.
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Figure 2: Days of Cash on Hand across Industries
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Note: Days of cash on hand refers to days of operating expenses covered by cash held, across United States-listed
firms, by industry. The figure shows 2000-2016 averages.
Source: Authors calculations based on Compustat data.
In fact, the heavy cost that the COVID-19 outbreak has imposed on the world
economy will eventually be borne by all parties. Shock-hit firms have already suf-
fered a collapse in revenues. Shareholders have already lost a significant fraction of
their stakes in firms. Workers have been laid off or accepted wage cuts. Suppliers
have postponed receivables. Creditors have started to renegotiate debts. However,
if firms start to default on their debts, they risk being pushed into bankruptcy. To
avoid reaching this situation, credit in the form of rollover of payments coming due
and new financing would help.
Despite the desirability for more credit, existing crisis resolution mechanisms and
bankruptcy codes, revised after previous financial crises, are not designed to deal
with an exogenous systemic shock such as the COVID-19 pandemic. They are fo-
cused on mitigating the spillovers of shocks that originate from the financial sector,
and on preventing those shocks from materializing in the first place (such as deposit
insurance, lender of last resort, and Basel III bank capital regulation). During past
crises rooted in the financial sector, policy makers would step in, resolve the financial
intermediaries or creditors in trouble (the “bad apples”), while shielding the rest of
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the system from a collapse. Once policy makers addressed the main problems in
the financial sector, bank lending to the real sector resumed, and economic activity
started to recover.
This time around, because the problem does not emanate from the financial
sector or from a particular firm or industry, the solution is significantly more chal-
lenging. Policy makers must be creative until the health crisis gets resolved, in the
meantime adopting policies that mitigate the shock and the impact of the social
containment measures on the real sector. This involves working with the financial
sector to improve the likelihood that viable firms are not pushed into default and
bankruptcy by a financial infrastructure that is not prepared to deal with a pan-
demic. It also involves policies related to the financial sector itself, which has been
affected by the shock, like all the other sectors in the economy, and which would
naturally tend to contract lending in these circumstances. Because financial systems
play a key intermediary role in channeling savings to productive activities, failure
in this function could aggravate significantly the already sizable economic impact
of the pandemic shock (Buera et al., 2020). Preserving the financial sector in good
standing can avoid even greater damage to the overall economy. Although financing
alone is not enough, a well-functioning financial system can help firms stay alive and
preserve their relationships.
3. Credit to Maintain Relationships during Hibernation
Firms depend on key and unique relationships with different stakeholders, such as
workers, suppliers, customers, and creditors. The relative importance of operational
expenditures to these different stakeholders varies significantly across industries, de-
pending on the nature of businesses activities (Figure 3). These relationships are
costly and time-consuming to build, maintain, and adjust. Firms generally spend
resources in building the best relationships for their needs. They usually require
relationship-specific investments that involve the creation of knowledge and reputa-
tion. For example, firms must find the best workers, suppliers, and creditors that
match their production processes. To do so, they must learn about workers’ skills
and capabilities, develop methods to adapt specific intermediate inputs to produc-
tion lines, and seek investors that might be better suited for their financing needs.
Firms also have long-term relations with customers that have become loyal to their
products and services. These relationships or matches, and the knowledge embed-
ded in them, can be thought of as an important intangible asset or organizational
capital of firms.
Pushing firms into bankruptcy would mean that the different relationships would
need to be reconstructed in the recovery following the crisis. Such a churning process
of destroying and then recreating relationships and contracts is far from efficient,
as it is slow and costly, leading to hysteresis. It is, thus, inefficient to destroy the
relationships between firms and their stakeholders, even during the lockdown phase
of the COVID-19 pandemic shock. A transitory shock that destroys a significant
7
Figure 3: Payments to Key Stakeholders across Industries
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Note: Payments to key stakeholders refer to the share of operating expenses owed to workers, suppliers, and
creditors, across United States-listed firms, by industry. The figure shows 2000-2016 averages.
Source: Authors calculations based on Compustat data.
mass of relationships could lead to long-term scarring economic effects and a slow
economic recovery.
Avoiding bankruptcy for all firms, however, is not a forgone conclusion given
the uncertainties about the magnitude and duration of the pandemic shock. Al-
though temporary, the shock has already been large and widespread. Many firms
have suffered massive declines in revenues and severe cash crunches. In this context,
honoring all preexisting commitments to the different stakeholders could quickly
turn liquidity problems into solvency ones.
Given the transitory nature of the shock, a good option might be what we label
“hibernation:” slowing the economy until the pandemic is brought under control,
while using fiscal policy to compensate for some of the many losses that the economy
needs to withstand. Hibernation means using the minimum bare cash necessary to
withstand the pandemic. This would imply different thresholds for firms in differ-
ent industries and countries. Some firms would be effectively shut down while the
restrictions last (such as movie theaters and restaurants with no takeout or delivery
options), whereas other firms could adapt and operate at a much-reduced capacity
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(such as airlines maintaining some flights and retailers selling only online). Hiberna-
tion is intended to freeze the firms’ relationships with their stakeholders, but not to
freeze firms or the economy itself. Even firms that have ceased operations during the
lockdown would need some minimal funds to stay alive, keeping their human and
physical capital ready to reopen when the lockdown passes. Therefore, the concept
of hibernation is useful for firms with different degrees of reduction in their routine
activities.
Hibernation would not be a simple solution, as the relationships between firms
and their different stakeholders, and the contracts that support them, might need
to be renegotiated to somehow share the burden of the inactive period. Borrowing
to maintain all preexisting contracts–assuming business as usual–could generate a
high and perhaps unbearable debt burden on firms by the time the recovery starts.
An ensuing debt overhang problem with so-called “zombie firms” could linger for
years (Caballero et al., 2008).
Given the uncertainties about the duration and magnitude of the shock, a key
question is the extent to which different stakeholders could absorb part of the losses
associated with the hibernation phase. That is, firms could increase their likelihood
of surviving the pandemic if they had some flexibility in negotiating payments to
their different stakeholders, while using their cash and borrowing capacity to cover
their reduced operational costs during the lockdown period.
The relationships with the different stakeholders are tightly linked. For instance,
the ability of firms to pay creditors depends on whether they have enough money
left over after paying other stakeholders, especially while businesses are temporarily
halted. The flexibility in contracts with the different stakeholders will ultimately
determine which relationship firms adjust to weather the pandemic. For example,
if part of a firm’s suppliers’ payments is variable, with room for adjustments, then
suppliers could absorb a share of the costs of continuing the business. This, in
turn, might allow the firm to fire fewer workers and also provide some slack to pay
its creditors. Exploiting the flexibility of some relationships could help firms ad-
just their expenses, keep important relationships active, and reduce costly churning,
while improving their prospects for the recovery.
Creditors could provide a crucial margin of adjustment for firms, especially if
they could offer extra financing that would allow firms to avoid breaking up their
other relationships. In addition to internal financing options, which are limited in
the short term, firms could turn to external financing from banks (such as credit
lines, term loans, and letters of credit) and capital markets (bonds and equities).
Some firms could also benefit from trade credit from firms with spare cash.
There are, however, three unique sets of challenges related to firm financing dur-
ing the pandemic shock. First, the private sector debt built up after the 2008 global
financial crisis means that many firms have entered this shock with high levels of
debt. There was around US$75 trillion of non-financial corporate debt outstanding
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in the world in September 2019 (IIF, 2020). Non-financial corporations in emerging
markets alone will need to pay back or refinance more than US$700 billion during
2020, which does not include the new financing needs that arise as a result of the
COVID-19 crisis. Such high corporate indebtedness represents an important source
of fragility and could impose significant constraints on firms’ ability to borrow, es-
pecially for emerging economy firms with debts denominated in foreign currency, as
many domestic currencies have plummeted.
Second, firms might have a limited capacity to substitute across external financ-
ing sources during this crisis. During a typical financial crisis, if the banking sector
shuts down and banks stop providing loans, some firms are able to substitute away
from bank loans toward bond financing (Becker and Ivashina, 2014). During the
COVID-19 crisis, all markets across all countries have been simultaneously hit; fi-
nancing from both banks and capital markets has dried up for many firms. They
have been left with no obvious source of financing, during a period in which access
to finance might determine their own survival.
Third, and maybe most importantly, creditors in general and banks in particular
have become reluctant to lend to firms, unwilling to absorb the higher credit risk of
firms. Amid widespread uncertainty regarding the magnitude and duration of the
shock, creditors have faced challenges in evaluating the likelihood of firm survival,
given that assessments of credit risk under these circumstances have significant mar-
gins of error. Firms that can cut workers’ wages or renegotiate accounts payable
with suppliers would pose lower credit risks for creditors. Yet, the crucial challenge
for creditors is that they have imperfect information about contract flexibility be-
tween firms and their other stakeholders. Thus, they might cut financing across
the board. Furthermore, there could be externalities. Individual creditors might
not look beyond their immediate contractual requirements or narrow self-interest
to fully understand the general feedback loop over time: firms that are not able to
obtain financing during the hibernation phase would have lower chances of survival.
Such market failures alone could justify a role for policy intervention to restore firm
financing.
4. Policy Interventions to Sustain Firm Financing
Policy makers could play a useful role in stabilizing the economy by working with
the financial sector to keep firms afloat. This would improve the likelihood that vi-
able firms are not pushed into default and bankruptcy. Financial sector policies are
complementary to other actions that firms undertake with both private and public
stakeholders to adjust previous commitments in response to the pandemic shock.
Since the pandemic struck, policy makers around the world have implemented a
large number of policies. Several of those policies try to help firms manage their lia-
bilities with different stakeholders, while improving their odds of survival. Whereas
there is heterogeneity across countries, the magnitude of different policies aimed at
10
helping firms manage their liabilities (“below-the-line” measures) is sizable when
compared to direct transfers to both households and firms (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Financial Policies to Firms and Direct Expenditures across Countries
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Note: Policy measures announced (relative to GDP) related to government revenues and expenditures (above-the-
line) and loans, equity injections, and guarantees (below-the-line). Above-the-line policy measures are the ones that
affect current fiscal budgets. Below-the-line measures are the ones that affect future fiscal budgets, i.e., they affect
net assets of public coffers. Both above- and below-the-line measures can be related to households and firms, but
below-the-line measures are more commonly used to support firms.
Source: April 2020 Fiscal Monitor “Policies to Support People During the COVID-19 Pandemic” (IMF).
In the rest of this section, we discuss different policy options available to policy
makers along two broad dimensions. One set of policies relates to adapting the
institutional framework to meet the challenges imposed by the pandemic shock. A
second set of policies is linked directly to the provision of credit to firms.
In framing the discussion, we start with the idea that a key goal of public pol-
icy for the corporate sector is to ensure that credit flows to firms during the (full
or partial) lockdown phase of the pandemic, especially to those firms facing severe
cash shortfalls due to the collapse in their revenues. This means not only refinancing
existing credit lines, but also extending new financing to existing and new clients,
given that funding needs are likely to increase with the ensuing economic recession.
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In considering the policy options, it is important to take into account the trade-
offs underlying the different alternatives that can foster firm financing, as well as
the incentives they generate. The effectiveness and fiscal costs of the different paths
adopted are also relevant considerations. Not all governments have the fiscal or
monetary space to implement the much-needed mitigating policies and might need
to borrow from the international community to do so.
Because payments to the different stakeholders are tightly connected with one
another and jointly affect firms’ prospects, the various policies that governments
implement need to be viewed as a package, as they are closely interconnected. For
example, a government policy that pays a portion of wages for workers that stay at
home reduces the financing needs of firms to cover such costs. Coordination across
policy makers–central banks, finance ministries, and regulators–is thus essential to
ensure policy effectiveness during this crisis.
4.1. Adapting the Institutional Framework
Financial systems are ill-equipped to cope with a shock like COVID-19 because
they are geared toward detecting idiosyncratic risk when it arises. Legal and reg-
ulatory frameworks have been established to prevent shocks and allow a clear plan
of action whenever shocks happen, with the goal of safeguarding the stability of the
overall system. For example, when a firm fails to meet a payment, regulation requires
banks to increase provisions to reflect the higher risk. In addition, the credit score
of the firm is reduced. If failure to pay the debt persists, the firm may be pushed
into bankruptcy. As a result, the existing infrastructure of financial systems could
actually amplify the problem this time around, leading to inefficient bankruptcies
and excessive destruction of relationships. Some existing work has discussed how to
avoid bankruptcies when there is a systemic shock or how to deal with them more
effectively if they are widespread, such as the idea of a “super Chapter 11” in the
United States or corporate debt restructurings (Miller and Stiglitz, 2010; Roukny
et al., 2018; Becker et al., 2020).
During the COVID-19 crisis, signaling firms in trouble would not be very in-
formative or helpful given that most firms have suffered a sizable and unexpected
negative external shock. To the extent that financial sector stability can be pre-
served, allowing forbearance and avoiding undue increases in borrowing costs might
be needed; otherwise, applying the standard procedures when firms cannot repay
their liabilities would hurt those firms even more.
Because unnecessarily liquidating firms will impose even larger costs to the econ-
omy in the longer term, policy makers around the world have started to adapt their
legal and regulatory structures to the unique nature of the COVID-19 shock. Sev-
eral of these policy measures are geared toward existing credit. For example, some
countries have implemented postponement of repayments of existing bank loans for
a number of months (e.g., six months). Some financial regulators have allowed banks
to freeze provisions if and when they postpone the loan of a client. Regulators have
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also allowed banks to freeze the credit classification of firms at their pre-shock sta-
tus (e.g., December 2019). That is, as long as the loan was classified as performing
before the pandemic hit, the renegotiation would not affect the firm’s credit score.
An important consideration of these measures is to determine for which set of
firms to apply forbearance. Some countries have implemented automatic postpone-
ment of loan repayments for all firms. Whereas universal application is easy to im-
plement and provides relief for all firms, thus increasing their likelihood of survival,
it creates significant risks for financial systems, because it imposes no conditions
on firms, such as having a good credit standing before the crisis. These types of
measure might, in fact, encourage the survival of zombie firms by overriding banks’
ability to act on hard and soft information regarding firms’ prospects and ability
to repay. They could also discourage new lending by increasing the probability of
further blanket forbearance measures (like a broad moratorium on payments to all
creditors or automatic stays in bankruptcy procedures) if the crisis deepens further.
In contrast, policies that allow for some screening of firms –drawing for example on
good behavior before the crisis– would allow banks to distinguish between different
credit risks. Such screening, however, could delay implementation and it would not
offer the same chance of survival for all existing firms.
In applying forbearance, regulators and creditors would benefit from providing
the right incentives, such that borrowers do not engage in ex-post moral hazard and
fail to repay their loans. This is usually hard to achieve, but to the extent that
regulators and creditors can use tools to penalize firms engaging in bad behavior,
they might want to deploy them to save on future fiscal costs. It seems important to
closely monitor the implementation of such measures and their potential impact to
ensure the soundness of financial institutions, to preserve the stability of the finan-
cial sector, and to signal the exceptional nature of the changes while the COVID-19
crisis persists.
4.2. Providing Credit to Firms
Policy makers around the world have considered several options to enhance the
provision of credit to firms. We divide these policies into monetary and regulatory
policies, on the one hand, and policies aiming to transfer risk to the government, on
the other hand.
4.2.1. Monetary and Regulatory Policies
Central banks have quickly responded by lowering interest rates. However,
standard monetary policy measures can have limited effects during the COVID-
19 outbreak. In normal times, monetary policy rate reductions by the central bank
lower the cost of funding for firms, thereby increasing corporate investment. With
pandemic-related containment measures in place, as well as the uncertainty about
the magnitude and duration of the shock, corporate investment might not be re-
sponsive to lower interest rates. Moreover, in many countries, interest rates were
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already at low levels before the pandemic hit, reducing the space for further interest
rate cuts.
Some central banks have also extended liquidity lines to banks at low cost, with
incentives to expand lending to the real economy. Nevertheless, unlike in a typi-
cal financial crisis, banks have generally not encountered major liquidity problems
(Danielsson et al., 2020). Instead, they have had to deal with a discrete increase
in the credit risk of firms, which depends on the magnitude and duration of the
pandemic shock. The heavy draw down of credit lines by large firms early on during
the pandemic shock might reflect an anticipation of firms that banks might reduce
lending as the crisis progresses and credit risk rises (Bloomberg, 2020). Liquidity
policies would work only to the extent that banks pass through the higher liquidity
from the central bank to firms.
Likewise, some financial regulators have reduced Basel III capital requirements
charged to banks, such as counter-cyclical capital buffers, conservation buffers, sys-
temic risk buffers, and Pillar II charges. To be effective, banks would need incentives
to convert the released capital into greater lending to firms in the context of increased
credit risk. Those measures alone might not provide sufficient incentives for them
to do so. In addition, not all counties have implemented Basel III, and therefore not
all have in place the space to reduce capital charges.
4.2.2. Transferring Credit Risk to the Government
In a context of high uncertainty, with lenders generally retrenching, governments
have stepped in and absorbed the increased credit risk, ensuring that firms have ac-
cess to resources during the hibernation phase. In particular, the state is generally in
a good position to offer credit guarantees when there is high risk aversion (Anginer
et al., 2014). Among other things, governments have capitalized state-owned banks;
scaled up public credit guarantee programs (typically covering 70 percent to 90 per-
cent of the loans); and supported large-scale purchases of portfolios of loans. The
feasibility of rapid delivery of these different policy options varies across countries
and depends on the institutional setting. For example, while some countries have
sizable state-owned banks, others do not. Also, some countries have guarantee pro-
grams in place, while others do not. To the extent that new distribution channels
may need to be created, challenges to implement this set of policies will arise (El-
Erian, 2020).
When considering policies addressed to transfer credit risk to the government,
it is useful to distinguish between large corporations and SMEs. Whereas large
firms use a combination of both bank credit and capital market financing, SMEs
rely mostly on bank financing. Also, large firms have larger spillover effects and
generate greater externalities in the economy than individual SMEs. The failure
of a large corporation could lead to more workers being laid off, possibly affecting
local labor markets; more suppliers being unpaid, possibly disrupting supply chains;
fewer exports, possibly affecting the availability of foreign exchange in the coun-
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try; and default on large debts, possibly affecting the liquidity and solvency of its
creditors. At the same time, precisely because of their size, larger firms also have
stronger bargaining power relative to their stakeholders than SMEs, and might thus
be better able to cope with the shock.
To the extent that SMEs’ access to external finance is mostly through banks,
channeling funds to large firms through the banking system may be inefficient, as
it could crowd out SMEs from this funding source. Indeed, some governments have
supported financing to large corporations through capital markets. For example,
they have provided a transitory capital injection by purchasing corporate liabili-
ties. That is, large firms issue securities, which can then be directly purchased by
the government or the central bank. In this case, both convertible bonds and pre-
ferred equity would allow the government to participate in the upside should the
underlying firm succeed. Once the shock subdues, the government can exit such
investments by selling the securities purchased to others in the market, recouping
its initial investment. The conversion of bonds to equity also works as a threat to
the firm, thereby reducing ex-post moral hazard. Because there are generally only
a few large firms in each industry, governments can monitor them closely (and, in
some cases, even regulate them) if and when such funding is provided.
Regarding SME financing, the capitalization of state-owned banks can help to
the extent that they are well-managed and have explicit mandates to lend to SMEs.
Other countries have scaled up public credit guarantee programs, which are focused
on the public provision of guarantees to loans made by banks to SMEs. Because
these programs absorb part of the firms’ credit risks (the government bears a sig-
nificant fraction of the costs in case of default), they provide incentives for banks to
lend to such firms. Other countries with fairly well-developed capital markets have
moved toward allowing the central bank or the government to engage in large-scale
purchases of portfolios of SME loans. Under such arrangements, banks sell secu-
rities backed by those loans to the government (or the central bank). In case of
default, the government bears the risk. Other central banks have developed lending
facilities to encourage investors to purchase securities collateralized by the portfolio
of SME loans. Both securitization policies can potentially have a multiplier effect
in the financing available to SMEs, if lenders were to use the cash obtained through
those transactions to lend again to SMEs. The effectiveness of these policies can
be enhanced if they were to include both existing as well as new bank credit to SMEs.
Some countries are also extending public credit guarantees to financing provided
by non-bank financial institutions. This includes financing companies offering in-
voice financing (factoring), leasing financing, and consumer financing. These policies
allow credit to reach the micro firms, which in many countries typically do not have
access to traditional bank financing. Because these firms are generally riskier than
SMEs, the coverage of partial credit guarantee schemes tends to be higher for non-
bank credit than for bank credit.
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4.2.3. Policy Considerations
Policies aimed at transferring credit risk to the government work best when they
are designed in a way that minimizes the cost to public coffers. Policy interven-
tions would benefit from three characteristics. First, scale is crucial to allow for risk
diversification, both across industries (some industries have been hit harder than
others) and across firms within industries (not all firms in the same industry will
go bankrupt because of the shock). To achieve this type of diversification across
the economy, the public sector is in a unique place, which is difficult for individual
private sector financial institutions (typically banks) to emulate. This diversification
would also help the government cope with the inevitable fiscal cost of the crisis.
Second, providing incentives for both creditors and debtors is also important.
For example, public credit guarantee schemes should be partial, so that banks retain
some “skin in the game,” and thus have incentives to monitor and screen borrowers.
Similarly, in the securitization policies, banks should keep a fraction of the loan
portfolio in their balance sheets. Regarding firms, the challenge is to avoid the ex-
post moral hazard problem of firms not repaying their loans, which could turn out
to be very costly for credit providers. This source of concern becomes more acute
the longer the shock lasts. If the shock lasts for many months, firms might find it
more efficient or profitable to declare bankruptcy (with all its costs of broken rela-
tionships) and avoid repaying their creditors, only to then “reproduce” the business
with new credentials–like closing down one restaurant only to open another one next
door shortly thereafter. It would be difficult for creditors under such systemic shock
to disentangle whether firms defaulted strategically or not.
Third, even when firms repay, there is a challenge in terms of providing incentives
so that firms use the liquidity obtained by financing policies to keep relationships,
instead of using it for other purposes. Firms might not internalize the social value
of the knowledge embedded in their relationships with stakeholders and might be
willing to destroy more matches than is socially optimal. This justifies a scope for
policy making in terms of providing incentives so that firms internalize the social
benefit of keeping relationships. The benefit of including those incentives has to be
evaluated together with the costs of monitoring them. For example, several countries
do not allow firms to distribute dividends when they receive public funds to endure
this crisis, which is a low-monitoring-cost restriction.
5. Conclusions
Because governments have limited resources, they need to prioritize which policies
to pursue when trying to save firms from collapsing during the COVID-19 pandemic,
at the same time that they evaluate their trade-offs. This is not easy to achieve given
the urgency of the needs and the speed at which decisions must be made. Never-
theless, it is worth keeping several considerations in mind when designing different
policy responses. For example, policy makers need to make decisions on how much
to allocate to large firms versus SMEs, to firms that have relationships that are more
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difficult to reconstruct, or to firms that would be more disruptive for value chains
if they were to go bankrupt. They might even be pushed to decide whether some
essential industries (such as basic infrastructure, health, and education) or indus-
tries hit hardest by the shock (such as travel, tourism, and other services) are worth
assisting over others. Furthermore, policy makers need to determine how much they
condition the assistance on keeping certain relationships over others. For example,
governments are usually keen on forcing firms to keep workers on their payroll, while
avoiding payments to shareholders. However, determining which relationships are
more valuable than others for different firms is not trivial.
Governments also need to think about how to allocate resources over time. Firms
might be in hibernation and need funds for several months, using bridge financing
to make it through the lockdown period. During this critical time, government as-
sistance might be needed the most, as banks and investors face higher uncertainty
about the length of the pandemic and the related probability of firm survival. Even-
tually, surviving firms will need additional lines of credit to restart or jump-start
their operations when they stop hibernating. Private lenders might be more willing
to lend at that stage when uncertainty has diminished and they would be in a better
position to assess firms’ prospects and credit risks.
The scope for policy action implies stark differences between developed and de-
veloping countries, as well as among countries within each group. Their different
initial conditions determine the set of policies they are able to implement and at
which cost (Hausmann, 2020; Loayza and Pennings, 2020). Countries with under-
developed financial markets, less fiscal slack, and more constrained central banks
will face greater challenges to channel credit to firms so as to avoid a breakup in
their relationships. Nonetheless, many developing countries have banking systems
that they could use to channel credit to firms and tools to assist banks if they
face funding difficulties at a later stage. Moreover, the fact that developing coun-
tries generally have more informal firms might help them reestablish relationships
faster once the lockdown measures are eased. These informal firms might be bet-
ter targeted through programs that assist households, which can use some forms of
personal loans. Moreover, pressure from households and firms with fewer resources
in developing countries could make the lockdown period shorter, triggering a higher
rate of infection and more rapid herd immunity, at a tragically higher mortality rate,
but requiring fewer resources for the quicker hibernation phase.
With the rise in global risk, developing countries have also faced a sudden stop
in capital inflows, higher costs to issue new debt in capital markets, and sharp
depreciations of their domestic currencies. These significant macroeconomic chal-
lenges, combined with the large financing needs that arise from the pandemic shock,
could trigger widespread sovereign debt restructurings (Blanchard, 2020; Gourinchas
and Hsieh, 2020). In turn, they could be followed by widespread turbulence in the
corporate sector, especially in countries where firms entered the shock with high out-
standing debt levels. The liquidity issues in developing countries might thus rapidly
turn into solvency problems–both at the firm and country levels. Multilateral pol-
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icy action, involving international financial institutions and creditor countries, might
help resolve a problem that can become common across developing countries.
Lastly, in designing policies for both developed and developing countries, it is use-
ful to acknowledge the transfers that policy actions produce across different agents
of the economy. The lockdown policies will tend to protect the more vulnerable
older generation, while restricting the economic activities of the younger generation,
which has a lower risk of becoming seriously ill. This effectively induces transfers
from the young to the old, given that some of the costs of such policies will not
necessarily be recovered (Reis, 2020). Policies to keep firms alive, however, do not
produce the same type of intergenerational transfers. Whereas they will be paid
mostly by the young, that same generation will also benefit the most from keeping
firms alive during the pandemic. Within the young generation, the socialization of
losses still entails transfers. Those that have the resources to survive the lockdown
without public assistance will in effect subsidize those that receive such help.
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